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Research studies within organizational knowledge are good examples for both analyzing and 
illustrating the debate regarding a paradigm shift in management. Most articles in the field 
focus on knowledge complexity and its socially constructed side. Researchers have noted a 
great deal of similarity between this socially constructed nature and the shaping elements of 
constructivism. They argue for a paradigm shift, rejecting positivism.  
To more fully understand this paradigm shift, and to address the number of methodological 
questions it raises, we have carried out a content analysis on a sample of the main articles 
dealing  with  organizational  knowledge.  Our  research  points  out  that  the  principles  of 
constructivism are difficult to adhere to within research design. It underlines the lack of 
specific methodological devices and lack of adaptation with the epistemological system of 
reference. Lastly, the present study highlights the methodological perspectives that underpin 
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There is much disagreement concerning a break with positivism, the dominant paradigm in 
management. The debate in Strategic Management Journal between Mir and Watson (2000, 
2001) and Kwan and Tsang (2001) is a good example of this controversy revolving around the 
need to center research within a constructivist framework in order to analyze organizational 
complexity.  Mir  and  Watson  (2000)  highlight  the  potential  offered  by  the  constructivist 
standpoint  as  regards  research  strategies  in  the  field  of  management.  They  focus  on  the 
context-driven nature of theory creation, on the role of researchers as veritable players in the 
research process and the non-separation between theory and practice.  
This perspective is illustrated here using studies on knowledge. The majority of recent articles 
on the subject insist on the complexity of knowledge, its unavoidably context-based nature 
and  its  socially  constructed  character.  Furthermore,  the  irreducible  relationships  between 
knowledge and praxis, knowledge and language, and knowledge and history are also outlined. 
A number of researchers have noted a great deal of similarity between such characteristics as 
the negation of the ontological presupposition, the co-construction of problems with the actors 
and  pragmatic  orientation,  and  the  shaping  elements  of  the  constructivist  paradigm  (Von 
Krogh, Ross and Slocum, 1994; Spender, 1996).  
 
In this article, we examine texts belonging chiefly to those concerned with the development of 
organizational knowledge rather than those focused on knowledge management (Easterby – 
Smith and Lyles, 2003). The empirical basis of our research consists of articles that address 
the question “How is organizational knowledge constructed?” This paper evaluates the fit 
between  the  espoused  epistemology  of  constructivist  authors  and  their  research  methods, 
arguing the need for internal coherence.  
 
Our contribution is built upon the following key questions: What are the “ingredients” of 
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If so, how does it operate? What are the specific features of the method and instrumentation 
adopted, and the resulting knowledge?  
The  crux  of  our  argument  is  that  claiming  to  take  a  constructivist  approach  does  not 
necessarily  translate  as  a  paradigm  shift,  as  researchers  might  not  be  using  methods 
appropriate to this new paradigm. Our paper is not a substantive critique of constructivism, 
but rather a critique of the way it has been deployed in studies of organizational knowledge.  
This paper is comprised of three sections. The first section examines the “ingredients” of the 
epistemological  shift.  We  discuss  the  various  principles  inherent  in  the  constructivist 
approach.  The  second  section  emphasizes  the  difficulty  of  putting  into  practice  the 
constructivist principles. We argue that this difficulty stems from the confusion that clearly 
continues to exist between the social constructs studied and constructivist framework that is 
perceived as necessary. The third section focuses more specifically on ways of conducting 
constructivist research into organizational knowledge, in particular by questioning the status 
of certain tools and/or methods.   
 
1. A constructivist view of organizational knowledge 
 
Many studies in the domain of knowledge management insist on the socially constructed 
nature of knowledge and stress the need for a break with the dominant positivist paradigm. 
Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001: 974), for example, are opposed to “a narrowly Cartesian 
understanding of knowledge and cognition”. Gherardi (2000: 212) contests the notion of “a 
functionalist organization theory” in order to address the question of knowledge, which is all 
too often reified and reduced to a mere problem of “ingestion and capitalization”. Spender 
(1996) deplores the fact that “the prevailing notion of knowledge seems naively positivistic 
and that of learning simplistically mechanical”. Pentland (1995: 4) seeks to break the mold of 
“objectivist  epistemology”  while  Tsoukas  (1996:  16)  abandons  rationalist  and  strictly 
representational conceptions of knowledge.  
The next section provides a definition of the terms of this paradigmatic break away from a 








































0    4 
knowledge, such as it has been highlighted in studies that claim to be part of this school of 
thought.  
 
1.1 The structuring elements associated with a constructivist approach in social sciences  
 
In general, researchers attempting to free themselves from a positivist vision in social sciences 
have tried to emphasize the potential that a constructivist approach
i has to offer. Their focus 
has been on its main dimensions, in particular on the negation of ontological preconceptions, 
the co-construction of knowledge with actors and pragmatic orientation.  
 
The negation of ontological preconceptions 
Constructivists consider that science cannot pursue the aim of knowledge of reality and that, 
in  fact,  this  reality  neither  exists  independently  from,  nor  predates,  the  actual  observer-
researcher. Primacy is given to interaction between subject and object and to the methods of 
knowledge development. Constructivists refute any nomothetic approach that presupposes the 
ability  of  researchers  to  discover  natural  phenomena  using  systematic  techniques  and 
protocols in order to eliminate any bias inherent in their analysis (Burell and Morgan, 1979: 
6). They banish notions like objectivism, empirical realism, objective truth and essentialism, 
averring that what we view as objective knowledge and truth is nothing more than the result 
of  a  specific  perspective  (Gergen,  1999,  Schwandt,  1994).  Scientific  knowledge  does  not 
constitute an object, i.e., a representation that exists independently of the researcher but rather 
is an activity and a process (Von Glasersfeld, 1991: 16). Knowledge and truth are created by 
the mind, not discovered by it. This leads to a pluralistic, relativistic and multidimensional 
conception of reality, with reality becoming the product of a variety of systems of symbols 
and languages.   
 








































0    5 
Continuous movement between theory and practice, as well as a more articulative, rather than 
cumulative approach to research (Piaget, 1970), implies that knowledge is the outcome of 
continuous  construction.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  the  researcher  (subject)  from  the 
phenomenon under investigation (object). In this respect, organizational “reality” or the truth 
that academic disciplines avow is, in fact, socially constructed (Mir and Watson, 2000: 943). 
Guba  &  Lincoln  (1989)  assume  that  the  observer  cannot  (and  should  not)  be  neatly 
disentangled from the observed in the activity of inquiring into constructions. What results is 
a dialectic and iterative process built around analysis, criticism, reiteration and re-analysis. 
Constructivists are especially interested in grounding their work in subjectivity and inter-
subjectivity, and in actively constructing and co-creating knowledge by working together with 
the actors involved. Understanding is participative and conversational. Agreement as to what 
is trust, for example, is subject to negotiations between all the parties participating in the 
research (Bernstein, 1983; Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Methods employed to generate, analyze, 
and  organize  data  and  to  link  evidence  to  hypotheses  are  not  under  the  control  of  an 
autonomous, disengaged, disembodied subject, knower, or ideal epistemic agent (Schwandt, 
2000: 199).  
 
Pragmatic orientation  
This approach is characterized by the fact that subjects of research are active both in the 
formulation of the research agenda and in the mutual learning between the researcher and 
actors.  Theory  and  practice  are  inextricably  linked.  Practice  exists  both  before  and  after 
theory (Mir and Watson, 2000) and there is a phase of pre-theoretical praxis that leads to the 
formalization of theory and ultimately guides future praxis (Butts and Brown, 1989). Whereas 
positivists  and  post-positivists  view  action  as  something  that  can  contaminate  a  research 
project’s findings, constructivists deem it to be a constitutive dimension of any scientific 








































0    6 
of the constructivist school of thought. Action created by, and for, participants with the help 
and cooperation of researchers is a factor that distinguishes conventional positivist studies 
from the constructivist project.  
 
 
1.2 The constructivist conception of organizational knowledge 
 
One  of  the  arguments  for  epistemological  rupture  is  constructivists’  insistence  on  the 
complex, dynamic and context-based nature of knowledge. Another is the focus on the role of 
language, communication and narration in the construction of knowledge.  
 
The nature of knowledge  
One of the most emblematic articles concerning the constructivist viewpoint in the field of 
organizational knowledge is that of Von Krogh et al., (1994), where the authors seek to posit 
the  idea  of  knowledge  as  being  socially  constructed,  emphasizing  systems  of  autopoiesis 
(1994: 58):  
 “Knowledge is a component of the autopoietic process; it is history-dependent, context-driven, and rather 
than being oriented toward problem solving, knowledge enables problems to be defined.”  
 
The  principle  of  circularity  is  mentioned  here  since  the  agent  finds  her/himself  within  a 
cognitive system from which s/he is unable to escape, and within which s/he cannot choose at 
what point it will begin and how it will function. 
In  addition  to  this  autopoietic  character,  many  studies  describe  the  dynamic  nature  of 
knowledge. As Orlikowski (2002: 253) points out, people improvise new practices as they 
invent, slip into, or learn new ways of interpreting and experiencing the world. Most of the 
arguments are built upon this notion of social construction of knowledge:  
“Individuals  are  now  seen  as  agents,  active  co-producers  of  their  surrounding  reality.  How  agents 
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According to many authors (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Blackler, 
1995;  Gherardi,  2000;  Tsoukas,  1996),  the  process  of  knowledge  development,  like  the 
process of learning, is a chiefly social and cultural phenomenon. Historical and indeterminate, 
knowledge is the product of interdependence between subject, object and context (Gherardi, 
2000: 213). 
 
It is from the cultural perspective that the concept of situated knowledge, and interpretative 
practices situated in specific contexts, has developed most completely (Cook and Yanow, 
1993). Spender (1996) argues in favor of a systemic conception that takes into account the 
dimensions  of  leadership  and  systems  of  influences.  According  to  this  view,  knowledge 
becomes a multi-directional concept type associated with the notion of “working together” 
(Gergen, 1999).  
  
While establishment of a constructivist paradigm may appear to be warranted by the dynamic 
and socially constructed nature of knowledge, it is precisely this view that we question in the 
remainder of the article.  
 
The role of action and language in the creation of knowledge  
This conception of knowing is intimately bound to the fact that knowing and doing, and 
knowledge  and  action,  are  perceived  as  being  mutually  dependent.  Social  reality  and 
organizational  reality  are  not  a  given  but  rather  are  continuously  constructed  within  the 
complexity of organizational activities:  
“Organizational knowing as emerging from the ongoing and situated actions of organizational members 
as they engage the world (…). All doing is knowing and all knowing is doing” (Orlikowski, 2002: 249- 
251). 
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fact,  in  the  construction  of  collective  cognition.  The  key  concept  for  understanding  the 
development of organizational knowledge is thus language activity:  
“Knowledge like plants is alive, then it can be talked about more like garden architecture as it becomes 
culturalized in different discourses.” (Gherardi, 2000: 213) 
 
Certain authors go as far as to refer to “linguistic games” (Wittgenstein, 1953) in order to 
demonstrate the importance of discourse in the emergence of knowledge:  
“What a social practice is depends on how human agents interpret it to be (…) Language is constitutive 
of reality – there is no privileged position from which reality might objectively be viewed”. (Tsoukas, 
1996: 19) 
 
2. Internal contradictions or the difficulties of operationalization 
 
The  following  section  asks  which  special  methodological  tools  are  used  to  negotiate  the 
paradigm  shift  and  develop  scientific  knowledge.  Here  we  inquire  about  the  coherence 
between  constructivist  principles  and  the  methods  used  and  highlight  the  need  for  the 
constructivist researcher to possess specific constructivist tools and/or interpretative paths 
 
2.1 Research instrumentation: absence of specific tools  
 
The articles we have analyzed readily point out the complex modalities of knowledge creation 
which is deeply rooted in practice. To what extent do authors take this into account in their 
own “production” of scientific knowledge? Is there any symmetry (or isomorphism) between 
how researchers conceptualize the process of creation of knowledge by agents (e.g. subject-
object  interaction,  intersubjectivity)  and  the  process  by  which  they  themselves  develop 
scientific knowledge?  
Constructivist authors have increasingly expressed the need for such questioning. Gherardi 
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“We authors who study how knowledge is produced, utilized, transmitted in the practices of “others” 
pay little regard to how we ourselves produce expert knowledge.” 
 
Tsoukas (1996) holds strongly to the idea that learning is a social, participatory activity rather 
than a cognitive activity, emphasizing that the human agent’s understanding resides, first and 
foremost, in the practices in which s/he is involved and that knowledge is not discovered but 
rather  created.  Even  if  we  accept  this,  it  is  nonetheless  difficult  to  clearly  identify  the 
methodological  consequences  in  studies  where  action-research,  or  even  participatory 
observation, paradoxically does not appear to play a key role.  
 
Analysis of the empirical materials raises the problem of coherence between epistemological 
positioning and the specificity of the methodological apparatus. While it may seem that an 
objective can be achieved through a wide variety of methods, it nevertheless remains true, as 
stated  by  Schwandt  (1994:  119),  that  it  is  legitimate  to  advocate  methods  that  are  more 
specific in nature, including participant observation.  
 
The articles we analyzed use a variety of methods ranging from non-participatory observation 
to the most longitudinal and participatory case studies. An initial example is provided using 
Pentland  (1995),  which  comprises  a  longitudinal  study  during  which  the  status  of  the 
researcher  was  limited  to  that  of  an  agent  participating  in  the  life  of  the  organization. 
However, the empirical materials and data collection methods are extremely classical: 
“I have a considerable experience base with this case, but because my role at the time was exclusively 
that of participant, I am an observer only in retrospect. I have notes and archival records from the 
time period in question, including design documents, notes from meetings, examples of audit reports, 
input forms, and other artifacts of the work process” (Pentland, 1995: 8).  
 
At the very least, this excerpt identifies incompatibility, or even incoherency, regarding the 
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running over two phases, one where he acted as a participant and the other as an observer. To 
be  exact,  we  would  have  to  say  that  a  constructivist  researcher  assumes  both  roles 
simultaneously. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the author does not describe the role of the actors in the 
research process. Consequently, there is nothing in methodological terms distinguishing this 
type of research project from more realist studies.  
A  second  example  is  provided  by  the  study  conducted  by  Orlikowski  (2002).  Using  a 
resolutely inductive approach, this author conducted a long-term, large-scale qualitative study 
comprised of interviews, secondary data sources and direct observations.  
Orlikowski (2002: 255) herself acknowledges this:  
“I was unable to participate in or observe project activities directly, thus my understanding of practices 
comes primarily from interview data and from the traces of work evident in project documentation.” 
 
An author may use data stemming mainly from interviews to which s/he has not attributed any 
specific  status  other  than  the  kind  that  is  inherent  to  normally  compiled  (i.e.,  not  co-
constructed) information. By so doing, s/he will not be radically deviating from a positivist 
stance. To this we can add the use of data triangulation, which is perfectly coherent with a 
conventional positioning à la Miles and Huberman (1991). 
Thus,  the  methodologies  adopted  are  in  contradiction  with  the  affirmation,  reiterated 
frequently throughout the articles, that knowledge is constructed in, and through, practice. For 
a constructivist researcher, this would appear to apply equally to scientific knowledge. 
In a similar vein, Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001: 984-985) used qualitative techniques and 
adopted  the  recommendations  formulated  by  Miles  and  Huberman,  two  self-proclaimed 
positivist researchers, in their own methodological approach. Other authors emphasize the fact 
that “a scientific description of organizational knowledge must always take the role of the 
observer into account” (Von Krogh et al., 1994: 65). However, this is rarely the case in the 
majority  of  articles  studied  empirically,  which  favor  establishing  some  distance  between 
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constructivist framework includes a design in which the researcher stands outside the system 
under  observation  The  explicit  reliance  of  Orlikowski  (2002:  256)  on  the  methods 
recommended by Eisenhardt (1989), a positivist researcher, and a description of data analysis 
using test / retest method illustrates this problem. 
 
2.2 The concern for objectification  
We  have  noted  two  main  characteristics  in  most  of  the  studies:  the  maintenance  of  the 
researcher’s exteriorized position and the attempt, however implicit, to objectify a study’s 
outcomes.  
 
The researcher’s exteriorized position 
Generally speaking, the authors have sought to understand and describe the process by which 
agents  develop  knowledge.  They  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  knowledge  may  only  be 
constructed collectively through a complex and context-dependent series of interactions. Yet 
these researchers themselves sidestep the analytical process that they willingly impose upon 
the  agents  under  examination.  This  involves  the  “paradox  of  attempting  to  establish  an 
objective science of subjectivity” as pointed out by Allard-Poesi (2005). Researchers appear 
to  construct  knowledge  in  isolation,  thereby  removing  themselves  from  the  process  of 
knowledge development, which according to these same authors, cannot be anything other 
than socially embedded.  
Many research projects that we have studied tend to involve a type of disengagement. The 
researcher  objectifies  what  s/he  should  be  co-constructing  and  seems  to  remain  scarcely 
affected by the knowledge of the co-creation process. As averred by Schwandt (2000: 195): 
“ reaching an understanding is not a matter of setting aside, escaping, managing, or tracking 
one’s own standpoint, prejudgements, biases, or prejudices. On the contrary, understanding 
requires the engagement of one’s biases (…) because understanding is lived or existential”. 
Comprehension  and  knowledge  should  normally  be  produced  as  part  of  a  dialogue  with 
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In an explicitly constructivist article written by Un and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) the following 
is stated: 
“In this paper, we take the view that firms are distributed knowledge systems, which means that they 
are composed of knowledge embodied in individuals and their social interactions ” (Un and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2004: 28) 
To be totally coherent with the paradigm to which they adhere, these researchers should be 
answering  the  questions  they  have  raised  while  developing  scientific  knowledge  in a  c o -
constructed manner with actors. Yet what they opt for instead is an eminently positivist and 
instrumental  perspective  that  places  them  in  an  exteriorized  position  in  terms  of  what  is 
happening in the field. They seek to test their model via factor analysis for all variables 
consisting  of  multiple  measures  and  report  their  reliability  scores  indicated  by  their 
Cronbach’s alpha. They conclude with their study’s predictive, causal, normative and valid 
status. The very fact that they have formulated the problem in these terms clearly shows that 
the explanation’s contextualized or idiosyncratic aspect does not constitute the focal point for 
their construction of scientific knowledge.  
Lastly,  we  detect  an  incoherency  between  the  constructivist  status  they  claim  and  the 
scientificity criteria they use to describe the fruit of their labour. The criteria they apply are 
exactly the same ones as those advocated by positivist researchers. 
 
Gherardi and Nicolini’s 2002 research study constitutes another example. The authors use 
observations of language and behavior in the Italian construction industry to understand how 
different  communities  of  practice,  such  as  managers  and  engineers,  make  sense  of  why 
accidents  happen  on  building  sites.  Data  is  gathered  in  the  form  of  both  informal 
conversations  and  formal  interviews,  that  is  to  say,  story-telling  and  narrative.  However, 
despite  the  constructivist  stance  that  Gherardi  defends,  researchers  are  not  perceived  as 
participants in a social and organizational process, neither is any commitment stance detected 
within  actors’  discursive  practices.    While  Gherardi  and  Nicolini  do  emphasize  that 
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behaving as a competent member in a discursive community (2002: 421), their approach and 
assertions remain analytical, without stressing any commitment to actors.   
 
The search for objectification of results  
Although  the  authors  we  studied  emphasize  the  complexity  and  social  dimension  of 
knowledge, many of the results obtained are inconsistent with this notion. When they are not 
purely rhetorical (Von Krogh et al., 1994), certain conclusions appear surprising in view of 
the stated epistemological premises:  
“The advantage of this framework is that it decomposes the overall phenomenon into smaller and more 
observable  processes.  Although  these  processes  are  distributed  in  time  and  space,  they  are  readily 
identifiable  and  can  be  measured  and  monitored  in  various  ways.  (…).  By  breaking  the  overall 
phenomenon  down  into  constituent  parts,  it  should  be  easier  to  isolate  problems  and,  hopefully, 
recommend practical improvements.” (Pentland, 1995: 19) 
 
The  possibility  of  observing,  measuring  and  analyzing  phenomena  creates  a  clear-cut 
distinction between the above approach and those elements that could provide justification for 
a constructivist framework for research.  
Even when the constructivist paradigm is overtly favored, contradictions can be seen in terms 
of method, as well as discourse. For example, Von Krogh et al., (1994) developed a concept 
of reality defined as a group of observable elements:  
“Conversations are interesting to study: they are observable events (…). The researcher has to rely on 
observable metaphors” (1994: 65). 
 
How  can  this  highly  analytical  vision  be  reconciled  with  the  systemic  viewpoint  and  the 
phenomenon of autopoiesis reflected by these three authors? Similarly, Pentland (1995: 8) 
who claims to belong to the phenomenological school poses a number of questions that are 
not entirely foreign to certain realists:  
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of systems in other contexts?”  
 
Here, the author is clearly accenting the criterion of external validity, which is precisely the 
approach rejected by constructivist researchers. 
 
A paradox exists between the conception of knowledge as described in the studies reviewed, 
and the desire to establish objective, or even functionalist, knowledge of the phenomena under 
study.  For  instance,  Von  Krogh  et  al.,  (2000)  propose  managerial  recommendations 
concerning organizational culture at a level intended to create a context propitious to the 
development of organizational knowledge. The prescriptive and frequently normative nature 
of the conclusions is insufficient to warrant the epistemological rupture proclaimed by authors 
in  this  field  and  is,  instead,  a  process  that  involves  the  reification  and  objectification  of 
organizational knowledge. 
Questions relating to the researcher’s exteriority, and to the objectification of knowledge, call 
for a very clear response to the following question: can a researcher opt for a constructivist 
approach to the concept s/he is studying (meaning for our current purposes, organizational 
knowledge) without accounting for its specificity
ii in his/her research design, and therefore, in 
the status of the scientific knowledge that s/he is trying to produce? If the answer is yes, that 
no  accounting  is  necessary,  then  this  question  leads  directly  to  another:  why  define  the 
concepts under study according to their constructivist connotation if this has no consequences 
in terms of apprehending the object of research? A negative answer, on the other hand, raises 
a sizeable challenge for any constructivist researcher, since s/he would then have to work on 
the study’s coherency with its own foundations, including its transition to instrumentation, the 
interconnection of tools and methods and the status of the findings given.  
 
In  the  studies  analyzed,  we  were  unable  to  identify  any  specific  objects,  methods  or 
instrumentation adopted, nor knowledge produced, that differed from other epistemological 
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instrumentation. In addition, we identified a glaring contradiction between the knowledge 
generation modes being affirmed in the constructivist paradigm and researchers’ scientific 
knowledge generation mode (cf table 1).  
The following Table 1 is a synthesis of our analysis.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
The gap between espoused principles and principles in use detected in Table 1 should be 
examined. First of all, we believe that there is frequent confusion between the study of social 
constructs and the paradigm of constructivism. Arguments in favor of the paradigm shift and 
the adoption of a more constructivist perspective hinge chiefly on the social construction of 
knowledge. However, is the study of social constructs enough to advocate an epistemological 
break with the dominant paradigm?  
Too often, the justification for adhesion to the constructivist paradigm consists simply of the 
interest that this viewpoint has in terms of analysis of social constructs. Mir and Watson 
(2000: 947) justify recourse to constructivism in terms of the specific characteristics of the 
objects under analysis. In this particular case, there is some confusion between the objects of 
constructivism, imputed to the agents, and methodological constructivism on the part of the 
observer-researcher.  
We, therefore, feel that the widespread confusion between study of a social construct and the 
socially constructed nature of knowledge does not support the demand for an epistemological 
break.  
The  social  sciences,  with  the  organizational  sciences  in  particular,  are  by  their  nature, 
inherently concerned with social constructions such as representations, discourse, learning, 
cultures, etc. However, study of social constructions does not automatically imply a paradigm 
shift. It is, in fact, by no means certain that a researcher claiming a high degree of realism for 
his or her theory would deny the fact that knowledge is contextualized and emerges from 
organizational practices. “Realists thus do not need constructivists to help them bring the 
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Thus,  as  Strike  clearly  shows  (1987:  483),  there  is  nothing  original  per  se  about  the 
affirmation that people take an active part in the knowledge construction process, since no 
one, asides from a few strict behaviorists, would deny this obvious fact. Schwandt adds that 
(1994: 126), “ even the logical positivists, the target of many who currently claim the label 
‘constructivist ‘ were themselves constructivists in the sense sketched above (…). Further, 
one need not to be an antirealist to be a constructivist”. Constructivism therefore represents 
something more than the superficial meaning that would otherwise be attributed to it in this 
framework, and calls for specific processes regarding scientific knowledge construction.  
 
 
3. Beyond incoherency: a few methodological perspectives  
To transcend these observations, we must propose new paths capable of guiding constructivist 
research.  
In  our  opinion,  two  orientations  lend  themselves  to  increasing  the  internal  coherency  of 
constructivist research in management. The first involves a more systematic discourse relating 
both to the status of the tools and mechanisms being deployed in the field. The second implies 
that the researcher should adopt a commitment stance, relying for instance on ethnography 
and/or action research as approaches capable of meshing optimally with the constructivist 
paradigm’s structuring elements. 
 
3.1 Highlighting reflexivity: towards an explicit discourse on the status of researchers 
and tools  
 
Mir and Watson (2000: 944) stated that a researcher operating within a strictly constructivist 
epistemology may use a variety of methods including, for instance, statistical analysis. We 
disagree. While we do not support the thesis of specific epistemological tools dedicated in 
principle to one paradigm or another, we do not feel that the entire range of available tools 
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justification. Thus, unless a (statistical) tool is put to use within a constructivist framework, in 
other words as a means of co-constructing meaning together with the agents in the field, we 
cannot concur with Mir and Watson (2000) regarding the neutral nature of methodological 
tools in research designs. Our position is close to that outlined by Weick in the preface to the 
work by Huff (1990) regarding the methodological device of the cognitive map. Within a 
constructivist research framework, we can understand that cognitive mapping may be used as 
a way to co-construct meaning working together with frontline actors. 
 
Alvesson  (2003)  analyzes  the  roles  played  by  such  widespread  methodological  tools  as 
interviews  in  management  research.  He  views  these  as  being  rooted  in  three  distinctive 
paradigms (neopositivist, romantic and localist). His thinking on interviews’ varying statuses 
in different paradigms bolsters our opinion that tools constitute vectors of ideology and are 
not independent of the contexts in which researchers try to mobilize them.  
In his/her research design, the constructivist researcher would be advised to show concretely 
how the actor’s integration can enhance thinking and the knowledge creation process. In the 
absence  of  any  discourse  on  these  topics,  it  is  hard  to  grasp  whether  there  are  any  real 
differences with a qualitative positivist research that relies on actor-delivered information 
without granting said actors an active role in the scientific knowledge development process.  
Schwandt (2000: 203) argues that the foundationalist-representationalist nexus is built upon a 
stance  of  disengagement:  the  subject  (knower)  stands  over  and  apart  from  the  object  of 
understanding. Schwandt goes on to focus on the moral and political requirements of social 
research practices and on the fundamental question: “How should I be toward these people I 
am studying”?  At issue is the positioning of one’s own ethical-political commitments as a 
researcher. A constructivist stance is especially usefully for (re)positioning actors at the heart 
of the research and scientific knowledge creation processes. 
All of our assertions underscore the idea that researchers should adopt a reflexivity approach. 
This  involves  critical  subjectivity,  which  is  an  awareness  of  the  multiple  identities  a 
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take place in a vacuum and, on the contrary, happens in a landscape of interests and power 
positions.  
 
3.2 Towards a commitment stance for the researcher – encouraging action research and 
ethnography  
 
These two approaches position experience and researcher-actor interactions as priority modes 
for the development of scientific knowledge that will be useful to actors.  
Action research postulates a change in social reality, both as a means for accessing scientific 
knowledge and also as a finality. Even if action research involves a pluralistic approach, we 
feel that its social nature, which is rooted in, and linked with, actors’ concrete problems, 
offers a good way of obtaining cooperation and adherence to an approach that is by nature co-
constructed.  
Ethnographic research could be viewed as one of the oldest methods in qualitative research. 
Reeves Sanday (1979: 527) has picked out researcher commitment as one requisite of this 
method, since researchers themselves constitute the number one instruments of their own 
studies. We feel that ideas such as researcher commitment and participation are particularly 
compatible with the constructivist paradigm which postulates that empathy and interaction 
with frontline actors constitute structuring and differentiating elements.   
 
Whether action research or ethnography, it is the researcher’s own experience that lies at the 
very  heart  of  the  research  process  and  should  signify  a  shared  production  together  with 
frontline actors, a strong involvement in the context and a desire to produce knowledge with, 
and for, the actors. Methods of this sort appear to be particularly judicious for conducting 
constructivist research into organizational knowlege. They help us to transcend the very thing 
that Charmaz (2000: 525) criticises in objectivist studies that, despite their wealth, remain 
“outside of the experiences”. 
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With the researchers fully involved in the process, collaborative discussion was encouraged to 
explore issues raised, and the feedback provided a starting point for a discussion which often 
went beyond the initial information itself, (Harrison and Leitch, 2000: 106-115):  
“The participatory action research begins the process of dialogue with individuals within the company 
who  have  access  to  the  feedback  as  a  starting  point  for  a  process  of  self-development  and  self-
awareness. And in so doing, organizations involved in such a process are likely to increasingly adopt an 
internally-managed  action  learning  approach  instead  of  an  externally-facilitated  participatory  action 
research perspective”. 
 
Thus,  a  process  of  circularity  and  dynamic  retro-action  is  enacted,  one  that  impacts  the 
research process itself and redefines it.  
Clifford and Marcus (1986) underline the dilemma of the researcher’s “authority” and the 
impossibility  of  true  collaboration  between  the  research  and  the  subject.  In  this  respect, 
ethnographic methods call for questions in the areas relating to power differentials (Wray-
Bliss, 2003). Constructivist researchers who want to reinforce the coherency between their 
paradigmatic foundation and research implementation should highlight a reflexive approach. 
This approach is associated with an embodied discourse that covers both their own status 
within the research project, as well as, the role that the researcher-actor tandem is supposed to 
play within the knowledge development process. There is also a need to provide increased 
precision concerning the status of the tools they deploy in order to demonstrate the coherency 
with the constructivist paradigm. As opposed to a traditional triangulation of data or methods, 
constructivist  research  into  organizational  knowledge  requires  an  emphasis  on  the  varied 
nature of the experiences that people have in the field. This involves choosing researcher 
commitment-enabling  methods,  such  as  action  research,  ethnography  and  participant 
observation. 
 
Table  2  below  summarizes  the  fundamental  hypotheses  distinguishing  a  positivist  and  a 
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main  proposals  as  well  as  the  specific  instrumentation  that  a  constructivist  positioning 
requires.  





Our study extends the organizational literature on knowledge by providing the first empirical 
analysis of how epistemic principles operate and by examining coherence between espoused 
principles and principles in-use. Of course, our work does not imply a substantive critique of 
constructivism.  It  implies  a  critique  in  the  way  it  has  been  deployed  in  studies  on 
organizational knowledge.  
We  have  shown  that  constructivism  cannot  be  merely  defined  as  the  study  of  social 
constructs.  The  socially  constructed  nature  of  organizational  knowledge  has  been  freely 
deployed  as  a  defense  of  constructivism  as  a  methodology.  In  other  words,  there  is 
widespread  confusion  between  the  objects  of  constructivism,  imputed  to  the  actors,  and 
methodological constructivism on the part of the observer-researcher. Our research reveals the 
contradictions between epistemic hypotheses and the methods used by researchers, and we 
argue for the necessity to link methods to epistemology. In this respect, our paper challenges 
some of the contentions that abound in the literature suggesting that methods are theory-
independent.  In  our  opinion,  the  method  used  must  be  consistent  with  the  value  system 
inherent in a given epistemology. We identified a major contradiction between the conception 
of organizational knowledge developed and the quest for an objective science of knowledge. 
This argument is all the more pertinent as these are the very researchers who wish to justify a 
paradigm shift. This internal conflict handicaps the process of knowledge development for 
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We contend that adhesion to a constructivist framework requires the use of methods truly 
based on co-construction of knowledge between researchers and actors, and that firmly place 
interaction between researcher and agent at the heart of the analytical approach. We argue that 
this placement will allow for a balance in the power relationship between the researcher and 
the actor avoiding the risk of relegating “subordinate” and “superior” subject positions within 
the research process.  We suggest that the researcher’s role be carefully attended to within a 
constructivist framework and that all efforts are made to avoid exteriorizing the researcher’s 
stance. Highlighting this reflexive nature leads us to concentrate on such methods as those 
employed in ethnographic research. 
Nevertheless, our work reveals three main limits. First, our sample focused on one field of 
management, i.e. organizational knowledge. Even if this subject is particularly significant to 
our research question, our study would merit to be enlarged to other fields of organization 
theory.  Second,  we  chose  articles  published  in  leading  journals  which  has  mechanically 
reduced the sample. Moreover, we have noted the small number of empirical studies which 
illustrates  the  difficulty  of  putting  into  practice  the  enounced  epistemic  principles.  Third, 
demonstration is limited to the constructivist paradigm. But this paradigm is not the only one 
to reveal problems of internal coherence. Other paradigms, considered today as alternative in 
organization  theories  (critical  realism,  evolutionary  epistemology,  pragmatism  or  post-
modernism) may be potentially studied and concerned by this question.  
 
The exercise in reflexivity that we advocate for enacting a researcher’s professional role also 
intimates that we ask ourselves questions about our own role in this study and to examine our 
own possible internal contradictions. Note that, first and foremost, the thesis being highlighted 
results from our own perceptions, and that it constitutes one analytical matrix amongst the 
many others that can be found in the studies in question. It is based on our own specific 
perspectives (perspectivism). We labeled the texts as well as a classifying them, emphasizing 
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research studies can be quite illuminating as they can help to identify forms, yet they also 
constitute  models  that  are  replete  with  methodological  problems  and  incoherencies.  We 
should remain prudent in this respect, as labels of this sort can serve to reify research studies 
as well as simplify them. As noted by Schwandt (2000: 205), “such labelling is dangerous, for 
it blinds us to enduring issues, shared concerns, and points of tensions that cut across the 
landscape of the movement”. Lastly, as stated by Lincoln and Guba (2000: 175), questions 
remain as to the control of our research. Who is authorized within a scientific field to ask the 
relevant  questions?  In  other  words,  is  it  possible  to  raise  questions  about  the  internal 
coherency of studies being conducted under the aegis of a legitimacy-seeking paradigm, when 








































0    23 
 
Appendix 1: Method 
 
We studied 13 articles on organizational knowledge published over the last 15 years in leading 
international academic journals. The choice of articles was based on theoretical representativeness and 
authors who had developed their train of thought in several publications. We first prepared an a priori 
evaluation table to identify indicators to be used in systematic analysis of the articles and adopted the 
thematic coding method (Miles and Huberman, 1991). We then scanned the empirical material and 
identified  nine  categories,  later  reduced  to  four  main  descriptors  or  indicators:  the  nature  of 
knowledge, study instrumentation, type of results obtained, and methods of development of scientific 
knowledge. This reduction was performed by means of comparison and reclassification (Miles and 
Huberman, 1991: 118) as a function of proximity of meaning between the categories themselves and 
between these categories and the constructivist literature. Phase 2 involved the coding of each article 
in accordance with the four descriptors (double-blind coding), and an article-by-article comparison to 
assess inter-coder reliability. The elements identified in the articles were compared with the paradigm, 
allowing  analysis  of  the  material g u i d e d  b y  t h e  t w o  c e n t r a l  s t u d y  q u e s t i o n s :  1 )  W h a t  a r e  t h e  
“ingredients”  of  epistemological  rupture  as  envisioned  by  authors  of  research  on  knowledge 
management? 2) If such rupture exists, how does it operate?  
 
 
                                                 
i Here we use the term constructivism instead of social-constructionism, even if both terminologies appear to be 
interchangeable in literature, and despite their significant proximities (Schwandt, 1994: 126; Schwandt, 2000: 
208; Lincoln and Guba, 2000: 167). With reference to Gergen (1985, 1999), social constructionism postulates 
that the world that people create via a process of social exchange constitutes a reality sui generis. As stated by 
Schwandt (1994: 127; 2000), social-constructionism puts greater emphasis on knowledge’s social dimension, 
whereas constructivists want to inject a cognitive and psychological dimension. Lastly, in line with Guba and 
Lincoln (1989: 19), it would appear that constructivism refers more explicitly to research’s methodological 
dimension, i.e., to the way in which knowledge is constructed and reconstructed – which is precisely the object 
of our study. 
 
ii For instance, the articles kept for the present database deal with organizational knowledge. The definition given 
for this concept is very distinct from its definition in positivist epistemology (c.f. 1.2). Knowledge is seen as a 
stock in the positivist conception, but apprehended as a flow in the constructivist vision. 
 
iiii This summative and propositional table draws its inspiration from Lincoln and Guba (2000) and from Morgan 
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Table 1: Is a paradigm shift relevant in the field of constructivist organizational 
knowledge? Espoused principles and principles in use 
 
 
  Espoused principles  Principles in use  Is a paradigm shift 
relevant ? 
 




Organizational knowledge is 
complex, dynamic, socially 
constructed and context-
based. 
Role of language, discourses 
and stories 
Epistemic positioning of the 
research, justified by the 
social constructs observed. 
Studying social 
constructs does not 




Co-construction of problems 
with the actors 
No possibility to separate 
the researcher from the 
phenomenon under 
investigation 
No specific tool  Contradiction in terms 
of both methods and 
discourse. Nothing 
appears as specific in the 
process by which the 
researcher produces 
knowledge. 
Status of scientific 
knowledge and results 
Importance of subjectivity 
and complexity 
Search for objectivity 
 
Contradiction between 
the status of 
organizational 
knowledge (subjective) 
and the quest for the 
objective establishment 
of a scientific corpus of 
knowledge. 
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ii: Basic assumptions characterizing the positivist – constructivist debate in the 
field of organizational knowledge: some proposals 
 
 
Issue  Positivism & post-positivism  Constructivism 
Conception of knowledge  Knowledge  as  a  structure  or  as  a 
concrete process 
Knowledge  as  social  construction 
and meaning-making process  
The  knowledge’s  priority 
metaphor  
Knowledge as a stock  Knowledge as a flow 
Conception of researcher’s role  Exteriorized  position  (speaking 
from the outside). 
Limitation of contamination biases, 
distancing  from  methodological 
tools 
Commitment  to  the  system  under 
study (speaking from the inside) 
Reflexivity regarding the status of 
the tools and of the researcher  
Epistemological foundations  Reaching the truth  To  obtain  phenomenological 
insight, revelation. 
Assimilating the meanings and the 
interpretations of the context. 




Action research (change to know) 
Ethnography 
Storytelling 
Language, action and interaction as 
priority  modes  for  the  creation  of 
knowledge. 






















































0    26 




Allard-Poesi, F. (2005) “The Paradox of Sensemaking in Organizational Analysis”, Organization,  
12(2): 169-196. 
 
Alvesson, M. (2003) “Beyond Neopositivists, Romantics, and Localists: a Reflexive Approach to   
Interviews in Organizational Research”, Academy of Management Review, 28(1): 13-33. 
 
Bernstein,  R.J.  (1983)  Beyond  Objectivism  and  Relativism:  Science,  Hermeneutics  and  Praxis. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsyvania Press. 
 
Blackler,  F.  (1995)  “Knowledge,  Knowledge  Work  and  Organizations:  an  Overview  and 
Interpretation”, Organization Studies, 16 (6): 1021-1046. 
 
Boland, R. J. and Tankesi, R. V. (1995) “Perspective Making and Perspective Taking in Communities 
of Knowing”, Organization Science, 6 (4): 350-372. 
 
Brown, J. and Duguid, P. (1991) “Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practices: Toward a 
Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation”, Organization science, 2 (1):  40-57. 
 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis: Elements of 
the Sociology of Corporate Life. Heinemann: London. 
 
Butts, R.E. and Brown, JR. (1989) Constructivism and Science: Essays in Recent German Philosophy. 
Kluwer: Dodrecht, Netherlands.  
 
Charmaz, K. (2000) “Grounded Theory. Objectivist and Constructivist Methods”, in Denzin, N.K and 
Lincoln, Y.S (Eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, London: Sage, Second Edition: pp.509-535. 
 
Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. E.  (Eds), 1986. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Cook,  S.  and  Yanow,  D.  (1993)  “Culture  and  Organizational  Learning”,  Journal  of  Management 
Inquiry, 2: 373-390. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M. (1997) “Disciplines of Learning: Contributions and Critiques”, Human Relations, 
50: 1085-1113. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M. and Lyles, M. (Eds) (2003) Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge 
Management, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M (1989) “Building Theories From Case Study Research”, Academy of Management 
Review, 14: 532-550. 
 
Gergen, K.J. (1999) An Invitation to Social Construction, London: Sage  
 
Gherardi,  S.  (2000)  “Practice-Based  Theorizing  on  Learning  and  Knowing  in  Organizations”. 
Organization, 7(2): 211-223. 
 








































0    27 
                                                                                                                                                       
or Dissonance?”, Journal of Management Studies, 39(4), June: 419-436. 
 
 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Harrison,  R.T  and  Leitch,  C.M.  (2000)  “Learning  and  Organization  in  the  Knowledge-Based 
Information Economy: Initial Findings From a Participatory Action Research Case Study”, British 
Journal of Management, 11: 103-119. 
 
Huff, A. (Ed), (1990) Mapping Strategic Thought, John Wiley &Sons. 
 
Kwan, K.-M. and Tsang, E. (2001) “Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: a Critical 
Realist Response to Mir and Watson”. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1163-1168. 
 
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Lincoln,  Y.S  and  Guba,  E.G  (2000)  “Paradigmatic  Controversies,  Contradictions,  and  Emerging 
Confluences”, in Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y.S (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (2
nd ed.), 
London: Sage: pp.163-188 
 
Lincoln, Y.S. (1998) “From Understanding to Action: New Imperatives, New Criteria, New Methods 
for Interpretive Researchers.”, Theory and Research in Social Education, 26(1): 12-29. 
 
Miles,  A.M.  and  Huberman,  A.M.  (1991),  Analysing  Qualitative  Data:  A  Source  Book  for  New 
Methods, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Mir, R. and Watson, A. (2000) “Strategic Management and the Philosophy of Science: the Case for a 
Constructivist Methodology”, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 941-953. 
 
Mir, R. and Watson, A. (2001) “Critical Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: Toward a 
Synthesis”. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1169-1173. 
 
Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. (1980) “The Case for Qualitative Research”, Academy of Management 
Review, 5(4): 491-500. 
 
Orlikowski,  W.J.  (2002)  “Knowing  in  Practice:  Enacting  a  Collective  Capability  in  Distributed 
Organizing”. Organization Science, 13(3): 249-273. 
 
Pentland, B. (1995) “Information Systems and Organizational Learning: the Social Epistemology of 
Organizational Knowledge Systems”. Accounting, Management and Information Technology, 5(1): 1-
21. 
 
Piaget, J. (1970) L’épistemologie génétique, Paris: PUF 
 
Reeves  Sanday,  P.  (1979)  “The  Ethnographic  Paradigm(s)”,  Administrative  Science  Quarterly, 
December, 24: 527-538. 
 
Schwandt, T. (1994), “Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry”, in Denzin N., 
Lincoln Y (Eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage: pp.118-137. 
 
Schwandt,  T.  (2000),  “Three  Epistemological  Stances  for  Qualitative  Inquiry.  Interpretivism, 








































0    28 
                                                                                                                                                       
Qualitative Research (2
nd ed.), London: Sage: 189-213. 
 
Spender, J.C. (1996) “Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm”. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17: 45-62. 
 
Strike, K.A  (1987) “Toward a Coherent Constructivism” in Novak, J.D (ed), Proceedings of the 
Second  International  Seminar:  Misconceptions  and  Educational  Strategies  in  Science  and 
Mathematics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: pp.481-489. 
 
Tsoukas, H. (1996). “The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System: a Constructionist Approach”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, Special Issue: 11-25. 
 
Tsoukas, H. and Vladimirou, E. (2001) “What is Organizational Knowledge?” Journal of Management 
Studies, 38(7): .973-993. 
 
Un, C.A. and Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004), « Strategies for Knowledge Creation in Firms », British 
Journal of Management, vol 15: 27-41. 
 
Von Krogh, G. Roos, J. and Slocum, K. (1994) “An Essay on Corporate Epistemology”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 15: 53-71. 
 
Von Krogh, G. Ichijo, K and Nonaka, I. (2000) Enabling Knowledge Creation: how to unlock the 
Mystery of Tacit Knowledge and release the Power of Innovation, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Von Glasersfeld, E. (1991)  « Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist 
Proposition », in Steier, F. (Ed.) Research and Reflexivity , Newbury Park, CA: Sage: pp.12-29 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Wray-Bliss E., (2003), “Research Subjects/ Research Subjections : Exploring the Ethics and Politics of 
Critical Research”, Organization, 10 (2) : 307-325 
 
 
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
1
5
0
7
6
3
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
9
 
J
u
l
 
2
0
1
0